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In the work on the economics of information which I began twenty some years
ago, I started with an example: how does one find the seller of automobiles who
is offering a given model at the lowest price? Does it pay to search more, the
more frequently one purchases an automobile, and does it ever pay to search
out a large number of potential sellers? The study of the search for trading
partners and prices and qualities has now been deepened and widened by the
work of scores of skilled economic theorists.
I propose on this occasion to address the same kinds of questions to an
entirely different market: the market for new ideas in economic science. Most
economists enter this market in new ideas, let me emphasize, in order to obtain
ideas and methods for the applications they are making of economics to the
thousand problems with which they are occupied: these economists are not the
suppliers of new ideas but only demanders. Their problem is comparable to
that of the automobile buyer: to find a reliable vehicle. Indeed, they usually end
up by buying a used, and therefore tested, idea.
Those economists who seek to engage in research on the new ideas of the
science - to refute or confirm or develop or displace them - are in a sense both
buyers and sellers of new ideas. They seek to develop new ideas and persuade
the science to accept them, but they also are following clues and promises and
explorations in the current or preceding ideas of the science. It is very costly to
enter this market: it takes a good deal of time and thought to explore a new idea
far enough to discover its promise or its lack of promise. The history of
economics, and I assume of every science, is strewn with costly errors: of ideas,
so to speak, that wouldn’t run far or carry many passengers. How have
economists dealt with this problem? That is my subject.
I begin by distinguishing the pre-scientific stage of a discipline from its
scientific stage. A science is an integrated body of knowledge, and it is pursued
and developed by a group of interacting practitioners called scientists. The
validation and extension of that body of knowledge is the intellectual goal of the
scientists, although of course the pursuit of that goal in turn serves whatever
personal goals such as prestige, reputation, and income the scientists seek.
These are only definitions, but I hope they are not strained or unnatural ones.
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body of knowledge, but that is only a relative matter since no science is ever
complete. This prescientific stage is also characterized by absence of a set of
interacting practitioners who are devoting a large part of their lives to the
accumulation of knowledge, and hence it is characterized by the absence of
cumulative progress.
1. PRESCIENTIFIC ECONOMICS: MERCANTILISM
We will find it useful to spend a short time with the large body of writing called
mercantilism. This literature ranges over several centuries, and over England
and western Europe. The literature comprises hundreds of pamphlets and
books, and includes participants of the stature of John Locke and William
Petty. I must confess at once that I have little direct knowledge of that
literature, for I have concentrated my historical work upon the period which
followed. However, three major studies of mercantilism are reassuringly agreed
upon the characteristics I wish to discuss. The studies are Edgar Furniss’ book,
The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism (1920), Jacob Viner’s famous
essay, “English Theories of Foreign Trade Before Adam Smith” (1930),’ and
Eli Heckscher’s masterly treatise, Mercantilism (1934).
A first characteristic of all three surveys of mercantilism is that they almost
totally lack a time dimension. Furniss will document a statement by references
to two tracts written more than a century apart. With the very first doctrine of
mercantilism - that it was vitally important to have an excess of exports over
imports - Viner begins a  sequence of illustrative quotations with Richard
Leicester who wrote in 1381. (Of course if one were allowed to go out of
economics it would be easy to continue the sequence of praises of an export
balance a full six centuries through 1981 and probably another six centuries
through the year 2581!) Heckscher also seldom finds it necessary to notice the
temporal sequence of two writers.
A second characteristic is that most mercantilists propose their own views
without any attempt to utilize or improve upon the work of other mercantilists.
There were sharp controversies, of course, but no regular pattern of sequences
of criticisms and responses. These writings, one may note, were almost always
briefs for special interests.
The third characteristic is almost a corollary of the first two: there was no
cumulative improvement in the doctrines being propounded. I quote Viner:
In many respects, indeed, as the mercantilist argument became more
elaborate and involved, it became more objectionable from the point of
view of modern doctrine, and, except with reference to the bullionist
doctrines, a strong argument could be presented in defense of the thesis
that the mass of ordinary tracts on trade in the first half of the eighteenth
century showed a more extreme and confused adherence to the fallacies of
mercantilism than did the writings of the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.  ...Insofar as trade theory was concerned, such progress as
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occurred was due almost solely to a small group of capable writers, able to
analyse economic problems more acutely and logically than their prede-
cessors, but not able to make a marked impression upon their contempo-
raries or even to attract their attention."
2
The process of analysis simply was not cumulative: there was little advantage
in studying foreign trade if one were born in 1680 instead of 1580.
I am now prepared to come to the rescue of an economist who needs little
rescuing: Adam Smith. A considerable number of economists, and a few
considerable economists, have emphasized the fact that Smith had many gifted
predecessors and almost all or perhaps exactly all of his ideas are to be found
expressed, and sometimes well expressed, by these predecessors. Some econo-
mists therefore wish to give the title of founder of economics to earlier writers
such as Cantillon. This line of argument, in my view, misses the point.
It was Smith who provided so broad and authoritative an account of the
known economic doctrine that henceforth it was no longer permissible for any
subsequent writer on economics to advance his own ideas while ignoring the
state of general knowledge. A science consists of interacting practitioners, and
henceforth no one could decently ignore Smith’s own work, and in due time the
work of Malthus, Ricardo, and the galaxy of economists who populated the first
half of the nineteenth century.
The change came fast. Smith himself did not interact with any writers on
economics after 1776, and of course even in his treatise he cooly ignored his
leading rival, Sir James Steuart. Five years after the first edition of the Essay on
Population (1798), by contrast, Malthus was making fundamental concessions in
response to Godwin and other critics. The age of economic science had begun.
How complete the transformation of economics has become may be illustrat-
ed by an episode earlier in this century. A. C. Pigou, holding the chair in
economics that his predecessor, Alfred Marshall, had made the most presti-
gious in the world, committed an error in stating the theory of external
diseconomies. He asserted that when a firm contemplated entry into a competi-
tive industry which is subject to rising supply prices of its inputs, that firm
would make a socially inefficient decision because it would ignore the effect of
its entrance into the industry in raising the prices other firms would have to pay
for inputs. The error involves a confusion of transfer payments with social
costs. The error appeared in his famous treatise, Wealth and Welfare, in 1912.
Allowing for the distractions created by the first World War, major econo-
mists soon devoted themselves to the problem. The two most famous refuta-
tions, by Dennis Robertson and Frank Knight, came in 1924,
3 but the essential
point had been made earlier by J. M. Clark and Allyn A. Young.
4 Under these
2 Studies in the Theory of International Trade, p. 109.
3 D. H. Robertson, “Those Empty Boxes,” Economic Journal, 1924; F. H. Knight, “Some Fallacies in
the Interpretation of Social Cost,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1924, both reprinted in Readings in
Price Theory (American Economic Association, Irwin, 1952).
4J. M. Clark, review of Wealth and Welfare, American Economic Review, III, (1913), 624; and A. A.
Young, review of Wealth and Welfare, Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXVII (1913), 682-84.60 Economic Sciences 1982
attacks even Pigou, the most remote of scholars, capitulated. The era had
already begun when only the detected errors of unimportant economists are
spared a prompt refutation.
2. ECONOMIC SCIENCE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL VIEW
The politics and economics of mercantilistic policy were the determinants of
the issues in the mercantilist literature. Indeed the prescientific age of any
discipline is dominated by the practical concerns of the society in which it is
cultivated. It is an easy step to the view that the main problems of a discipline,
even after it becomes an organized science, are posed directly by the para-
mount problems and policies of the society in which it is pursued.
Wesley Clair Mitchell went so far as to attempt to present a systematic
history of economic thought in terms of the responses of each generation to its
environment:
One of the results of any survey of the development of economic doctrines
is to show that in large measure the important departures in economic
theory have been intellectual responses to changing current problems; that
is, the economic theorists who have counted most in the development of
thought have been men who have been deeply concerned with problems
that troubled their generation.
As examples, he told us
Malthus’s problem of population was as obviously an intellectual reflec-
tion of current events as Adam Smith’s “obvious and simple system of
natural liberty.”
The description of the course of English politics in Parliament shows
that Ricardo got this problem [how to determine the way in which the
produce of the country was divided] - his appreciation of its importance -
not in his study, but by following current events. It should also be noticed
that Ricardo got his peculiar conception of what the problem of distribu-
tion is directly from the Parliamentary struggle.
5
Yet when Mitchell reached the eighteen-seventies and the rise of the marginal
utility theory, he abandoned the attempt to find environmental changes to
which economic theory was responding. He attributed the abandonment to the
difficulty of achieving understanding of and detachment toward more recent
work, not the failure of his hypothesis.
6
The central task of an empirical science such as economics is to provide
general understanding of events in the real world, and ultimately all of its
theories and techniques must be instrumental to that task. That is very differ-
ent from saying, however, that it must be responsive to the contemporaneous
conditions and problems of the society in which it is situated.
5 Types of Economic Theory (New York, Augustus Kelley, 1967), I, 13, 235, 286
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If the problems of economic life changed frequently and radically, and lacked
a large measure of continuity in their essential nature, there could not be a
science of economics. An essential element of a science is the cumulative growth
of knowledge, and that cumulative character could not arise if each generation
of economists faced fundamentally new problems calling for entirely new
methods of analysis. The change of problems and methods would also under-
mine the training of economists: if the young studied under the old, the young
could be confident that they were learning things that were rapidly becoming
obsolete. A science requires for its very existence a set of fundamental and
durable problems.
In economics the most fundamental of these central problems is the theory of
value. The theory of value must explain how the comparative values of different
goods and services are established. Until that problem is solved, it is not
possible to analyse for scientific purposes what will be produced and in what
quantities, how the resources will be employed in producing the menu of
outputs, and how the resources will be valued. Without a theory of value the
economist can have no theory of international trade nor possibly a theory of
money. This central problem of value does not change in its essential content if
one seeks to explain values in rural or urban societies, or in agricultural or
industrial societies. Indeed, if the problem of value were so chameleonlike as to
alter its nature whenever the economic or political system altered, each epoch
in economic life would require its own theory, and short epochs would get
short-lived theories.
If an empirical science requires for its very existence a set of fundamental
and persistent phenomena, that is not the only kind of phenomena with which
it will deal. It will continuously be confronted with new circumstances which
call for more than a routine application of standard knowledge. Thus the
energy crisis of the nineteen-seventies has provided much employment to
economists, but it has not called for important changes in economic science.
An empirical science has a second, and vastly more important, interest in
and responsiveness to, contemporary problems: its received theory will at times
be incapable of dealing with these problems. When England began the long
term importation of grain at the time of the Napoleonic wars, and pressed hard
upon its domestic production capacities, the economists introduced the law of
diminishing returns in dealing with the price of grain. It would be difficult to
deny a role to the environment in the appearance of this law. So much for the
origin of that theory: it would not help us one whit in understanding
Edgeworth’s famous analysis of this law in 1911 to look at his economic
environment. The important place that diminishing returns has achieved in
economics is due precisely to the fact that its usefulness was not limited to
Ricardo’s analysis of agriculture in Great Britain.
The responsiveness of economics to environmental problems will naturally
be more complete and more prompt, the more urgent the problems of the day.
The response will also be more complete, the less developed the relevant body
of economic analysis. The responsiveness of macroeconomics to contemporary
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fact that the neoclassical theory could not account for the persistent unemploy-
ment of that decade. A generation later, persistent inflation even with less than
full employment was equally decisive in ending Keynes’s supremacy. If and
when macroeconomics produces a good theory of the business cycle, its respon-
siveness to environmental changes will diminish sharply.
A viable and healthy science requires both the persistent and almost timeless
theories that naturally ignore the changing conditions of their society and the
unsettled theories that encounter much difficulty in attempting to explain
current events. Without the base of persistent theory, there would be no body of
slowly evolving knowledge to constitute the science. Without the challenges of
unsolved, important problems, the science would become sterile.
One final observation: there is no simple or known relationship between
environmental changes and changes in economic analysis. During the Industri-
al Revolution, economists adopted the law of diminishing returns but ignored
the most sustained and widespread growth of output that the world had yet
observed. The vast governmental income redistribution programs of the last
hundred years have only recently attracted the attention of economic theorists.
The scholars who create economic theory do not read the newspapers regularly
or carefully during working hours.
3. THE OMNISCIENT SCHOLAR?
Once a science becomes well populated, has achieved a secure academic base,
and is equipped with the machinery of intellectual exchange-journals, learned
societies, and conferences - it is presented with a stream of proposals for new
directions or new methods for research. Indeed, the science itself carefully
fosters the output of new ideas. Robert K. Merton has shown in his fundamen-
tal studies of the reward structure of science that immense value is attached to
priority in the development of successful new ideas.
7
And yet ideas will be proposed which are ignored at the time, but at some
later date are accepted (almost invariably after an independent rediscovery) as
important to the science. This phenomenon repeatedly called forth the rebukes
of Schumpeter in his great History of Economic Analysis. Here are examples of
men who, Schumpeter believed, quite correctly, to be “writing above their
time”:
Longfield’s merits may be summed up by saying that he overhauled the
whole of economic theory and produced a system that would have stood
up well in 1890.
[John Stuart Mill] even went so far as to compare [John] Rae’s perfor-
mance on accumulation with Malthus’ performance on population. And
all this, written in what was to be for forty years the most influential
textbook on economics, was insufficient to introduce Rae to the profession
or to rouse any curiosity concerning the rest of his book!
8
7 The Sociology of Science (University of Chicago Press, 1973), esp. Ch. 14.
8 History of Economic Analysis (New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 465, 496G. J. Stigler 63
Of course Schumpeter, than whom no economist was more sophisticated, gave
some sensible reasons for these acts of neglect of genius, but he failed to give the
most important reason of all.
In every period of the active pursuit of a science, new ideas are continually
being proposed. Any new idea - a  new conceptualization of an existing pro-
blem, a new methodology, or the investigation of a new area - cannot be fully
mastered, developed into the stage of a tentatively acceptable hypothesis, and
possibly exposed to some empirical tests, without a large expenditure of time,
intelligence, and research resources. That is fact 1. Fact 2 is that the over-
whelming majority of these new ideas will prove to be sterile - in fact, quite
possibly all the new ideas of a period of years will prove to be sterile. Only
afterward, with the fullness of knowledge that history sometimes provides, can
we identify the truly fertile ideas of a period.
Some men have superb instincts as to which of the new ideas of the time will
repay intensive exploration, but no one is infallible. Even the greatest of
economists pursue some problems that take them nowhere. In the last months
of his life, Ricardo was still attempting to fashion a precise measure of value,
and not advancing one inch. John Stuart Mill and Leon Walras devoted much
energy to the propagation of the proposal of nationalization of unanticipated
future increments of land values - not  the first time or the last that someone
proposed nationalizing a sum with an expected value no larger than zero.
Jevons could not get over the idea that cycles in sunspots left their tracks on
commercial cycles. The great Pareto took a detour through the question of the
order in which people consumed various products, out of a belief that this was
related to the order of integration of a partial differential equation.
Not only great economists, but all economists who pursue anything, pursue
will-o’-the-wisps for periods of time that are painful to consider in retrospect.
In the nineteen-thirties, the area variously known as industrial organization
and micro-economics-with-evidence, was offered the following major research
hypotheses:
1. The ownership and the effective control of large corporations have become
separated.
2. The phenomenon of product differentiation calls for fundamental changes in
the theory of the firm and the industry. (The theory of monopolistic compe-
tition.)
3. Prices do not respond downward to changes in supply and demand, perhaps
because a particular expectation with respect to rivals’ behavior creates a
kink in the firm’s demand curve.
4. The economist is able to construct criteria of the satisfactory, or alternative-
ly the unsatisfactory, performance of an industry, where the satisfaction of
the economist should be shared by society. (The theory of workable compe-
tition.)
These were not the only new research proposals: the annual output of new
theories of oligopoly was supplemented by searches for truth through the
feeding and wining of business leaders.64 Economic Sciences 1982
Each of the four research proposals I have listed received a good deal of
attention: none lost its fashionable appeal to at least some highly competent
economists for at least live or ten years, and indeed not one is a cold corpse
today. But it is also true that not one of them has been absorbed into the
mainstream of price theory as a regular and significant part of the analysis of
the workings of markets and industries. Quite possibly one could find that
Schumpeter followed several of these detours for at least a short distance. Of
course some important new ideas (such as that of Hotelling on exhaustible
resources and Ramsey on optimal pricing) were being neglected. To err is not
only human but also scientific.
4. THE CONTINUITY OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
“Nature does not move in jumps”, says the proverb, and a science also
progresses through time without making large jumps. This continuity is often
illustrated by two kinds of evidence.
One evidence of scientific continuity that has been adduced by Robert
Merton is the existence of multiple and nearly simultaneous independent
discoveries of a theory by several scientists. The popular examples in econom-
ics are the discovery of the theory of rent by Edward West and Thomas Robert
Malthus in 1815, and the publication of the theory of utility in the early 1870’s
by Jevons, Menger, and Walras. In each case, the new idea was presumably
appropriate to the development of economics at the time: the rent theory
allowed the construction of a theory of the distribution of income; and the
utility theory led naturally to the marginal productivity theory and the general-
ization of the theory of utility-maximizing behavior.
9
This continuity is also used to explain the not uncommon phenomenon of the
failure of a man of genius to get acceptance of his ideas from his contempora-
ries, even though later generations will applaud the performance. Augustin
Cournot, for example, was an important scholar in one of the leading intellectu-
al centers of Europe, but he could not persuade economists in 1838 that the
mathematical theory of maxima and minima was a useful tool for economic
analysis.
I would find it more persuasive to establish the continuity of scientific
development by a close examination of the evolution of important concepts in
economics, but that route does not seem appropriate to the occasion.” Candor
compels me to note that the route of close historical study would not be easy to
9 I have presented elsewhere an alternative interpretation of Merton’s theory of multiple discov-
eries which emphasized even more than he does how essential it is that science be “ready” for a new
idea: see “Merton on Multiples, Denied and Affirmed,” Transaction of the New York Academy of
Sciences, 1980, reprinted in The Economist as Preacher (University of Chicago Press, 1982).
10For a fascinating case study in another discipline, see Nicholas Fisher, “Avogadro and the
Historians,” History of Science, June and September, 1982.G.J. Stigler 65
follow because it would require definite answers to the questions: what is a
large change in a science? What is a rapid change in a science?
Gary Becker has suggested that a substantial resistance to the acceptance of
new ideas by scientists can be explained by two familiar economic concepts.
One is the concept of specific human capital: the established scholar possesses a
valuable capital asset in his command over a particular body of knowledge.
That capital would be reduced if his knowledge were made obsolete by the
general acceptance of a new theory. Hence, established scholars should, in their
own self-interest, attack new theories, possibly even more than they do in the
absence of joint action. The second concept is risk aversion, which leads young
scholars to prefer mastery of established theories to seeking radically different
theories. Scientific innovators, like adventurers in general, are probably not
averse to risk, but for the mass of scholars in a discipline, risk aversion is a
strong basis for scientific conservatism. We will find the specific human capital
theory illustrated in the episodes to which I shall soon turn.
No one can describe the precise characteristics or content of a new piece of
scientific work that will find ready and eager reception from the scientists of a
period. Indeed, if knowledge sufficient to identify the theories that will succeed
were possessed, it would be of immense value in finding and developing those
theories and would therefore be the key to scientific fame. To the scientist such
knowledge would be much more valuable than an accurate method of predict-
ing stock prices! Even without such a priceless key to the understanding of
scientific innovation, it is interesting to examine several routes by which a
scientific idea makes its way into the work of economists. I illustrate two of
these routes by subjects on which I have worked.
Acceptance without Struggle: The Economics of Information
Economists have always known that the extent and accuracy of the knowledge
of the economic actor had influence, and often a decisive influence, on his
behavior and therefore on the behavior of markets.
One striking example of this critical role of information is provided by the
theory of oligopoly. The first formulation of the problem of oligopoly as a
specific problem in economic theory was made by Cournot, whose long failure
to get acceptance I have already mentioned. It was essential, in explaining how
each of two rivals in a market would behave, to attribute to each some belief
about the behavioral pattern of the other. Cournot made the assumption that
each assumed that the rival did nothing in response to his own actions. The
later theories of oligopoly all rest upon different assumptions concerning pat-
terns of behavior which each seller attributes to his rivals. A dozen other areas
of economic analysis, such as the workings of the labor market and the role of
advertising, also rest squarely on assumptions about information of the eco-
nomic actors. In this tradition, the amount of information possessed by indivi-
duals in any market was arbitrarily postulated rather than derived from
economic principles. The consensus was that consumers knew little, traders on
organized exchanges a great deal; investors were either gullible or omniscient.
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Knowledge in Society,“
11  had not addressed the principles of acquisition of
knowledge.
I proposed (in 1961) the use of the standard economic theory of utility-
maximizing behavior to determine how much information people would ac-
quire with special attention to the prices at which they would buy and sell, and
a year later made an application of the analysis to labor markets. There is one
interesting feature of the subsequent history of the reception of this work by
economists to which I wish to call attention.
The proposal to study the economics of information was promptly and
widely accepted, and without even a respectable minimum of controversy.
Within a decade and a half, the literature had become so extensive and the
theorists working in the field so prominent, that the subject was given a
separate classification in the Index of Economic Articles, and more than a hundred
articles a year are now devoted to this subject.
The absence of controversy certainly was no tribute to the definitiveness of
my exposition. I had chosen fixed sample rather than sequential analysis,
which a majority of later economists prefer. I had not presented a general
equilibrium solution in which the behavior of both sides of a market is ana-
lyzed, and that step proved difficult to take. I had done little with information
on quality and other variables, in contrast to prick, although I soon extended
the approach to a different kind of information in the theory of oligopoly. I had
not applied the theory to the problem of unemployment, a literature initiated
by an important paper by Armen Alchian.
12 All I had done was to open a door
to a room that contained many fascinating and important problems.
The absence of controversy was due instead to the fact that no established
scientific theory was being challenged by this work: in fact, all I was challeng-
ing was the neglect of a promising subject. Moreover, the economics of infor-
mation was susceptible to study by quite standard techniques of economic
analysis. The theory immediately yielded results which were intuitively or
observationally plausible. Here was a Chicago theory that didn’t even annoy
socialists!
Acceptance by Necessity: The Economics of Regulation
The work on the economics of regulation has entered economics by a different
route.
The modern era of economists’ interest in the economic workings of the state
may be dated from the influential work of Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory
of Democracy (1957), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of
Consent (1962). Although I had read these works with deep interest and admira-
tion, my own work on regulation at first followed a different, more empirical
route.
11 American Economic Review, September 1945.
12 Information Costs, Pricing, and Resource Unemployment, in Employment and Inflation Theory, ed.
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An examination of the economic literature had revealed no serious profes-
sional attempt to measure the impact of public regulation in areas with long
histories: the regulation of rates of electrical utilities; the review of new issues
by the Securities and Exchange Commission; and the antitrust policy of the
United States. The investigations of these problems, strongly reinforced by
related work of colleagues and students, gradually forced me to confront a
question that should have been obtrusively obvious at once: why does the state
engage in its regulatory activities?
The answer (at least for an economist) seemed to lie much less in the
theorems of welfare economics or the prescriptions of traditional political
science, than in the systematic examination of the self-interest of the various
participants in political life. These participants, to be sure, operated under
different rules and constraints than the traders in markets, but that did not
argue against using that powerful tool of economic analysis, the theory of
utility-maximizing behavior. Once the economist can identify the costs and
returns from various actions, this theory allows him to make predictions of
behavior that have been reasonably successful.
This approach proved to be highly uncongenial to many economists. My
teacher, Frank Knight, had often expressed the belief that many economists
still share, that the actors (and especially the voters) in political life are
ignorant, emotional, and usually irrational. In a famous, unpublished speech
he ended a parable with the words: “Truth in society is like strychnine in the
individual body, medicinal in special conditions and minute doses; otherwise
and in general, a deadly poison.” These economists believe that voters are
myopic and forgetful, and that political institutions are designed or perverted
to allow the public servants to pursue chiefly their own interests. Another and
perhaps larger group of economists is critical of the utility-maximizing ap-
proach for the opposite reason: that it appears to be an attack on the chief
instrument for purposive social improvement that a society possesses: the state.
Nevertheless the economic theory of regulation is achieving a substantial
scientific prosperity. Its findings with respect to both the operation and the
origins of regulatory policies directed to particular industries (such as the
securities markets, transportation, and occupational licensing) command a
substantial support. To be sure, the explanatory triumphs have not been
overwhelming, and indeed the theory itself is still relatively primitive. The
main reason for the considerable acceptance of the approach is that fundamen-
tal rule of scientific combat: it takes a theory to beat a theory. No amount of
scepticism about the fertility of a theory can deter its use unless the sceptic can
point to another route by which the scientific problem of regulation can be
studied successfully.
There is an interesting asymmetry in the success of this literature in dealing
with the two problems into which the theory is commonly divided: why are
regulatory policies adopted and abandoned; arid what are their effects? Econo-
mists have been much more successful in measuring effects of policies than in
explaining their adoption. The explanation is that one can choose the effects of
a policy to study, and usually more easily measured effects are chosen for study.68 Economic Sciences 1982
One has no such options when addressed with the question: why did the
United States adopt an antitrust policy in 1890?
Thus studies of effects of regulatory policies have usually been concerned
with the effects upon prices and outputs, although the effects desired by the
supporters of these policies have probably been upon the distribution of in-
come. The panoply of regulatory measures can be used to effect vast income
redistributions, and these redistributions of income do not appear explicitly in
the budget of the state. The frequent exclusion of new entrants from a field, for
example, leads to smaller outputs, higher prices, and higher profits for the
protected enterprises, and allows these benefits to increase with the growth of
the protected area. If these income transfers are as large as fragmentary
evidence suggests, the theory of regulation may well become a full partner of
tax and expenditure theory in public finance.
Acceptance by Trial by Combat?
Is it exceptional of the theories I have been discussing that neither was
subjected to direct trial by combat with an alternative theory? We speak so
often of the competition of ideas: how is that competition conducted?
The direct confrontation of two alternative theories, each seeking to explain
the same body observable phenomena, is not common in economics.
13 (It is
perhaps encountered more often in macroeconomics than in microeconomics.)
Two modern examples from microeconomics will illustrate the proposition that
economists seldom choose between directly rival theories on the basis of critical
empirical tests:
(1) The doctrine of limit pricing by oligopolists asserted that the firms in an
industry would set prices at such a level as to discourage or prevent entry of
additional firms into an industry. The theory had a long pre-history under the
name of potential competition, but it was given an explicit formulation by
Sylos-Labini, Joe Bain, and Franco Modigliani.
14 This version gave rise to a
substantial literature, but at no time was a direct empirical test made of this
theory as against explicit alternative theories of oligopoly behavior.
(2) The Pigovian theory of external economies was challenged directly by
Ronald Coase, who in effect argued that the Pigovian theory had assumed non-
economic behavior on the part of the economic actors in a wide class of
phenomena.
15 This challenge was met for a time by a considerable number of
counter arguments, but these arguments were addressed to the logic of what
has come to be known as the Coase theorem. No explicit comparison of the
13 I once made such a direct confrontation of the theory of the kinked oligopoly demand curve and
more traditional theories, finding no evidence to support the existence of a kink. The theory has
disappeared from professional work but lives in every textbook. See “The Literature of Economics:
The Case of the Kinked Oligopoly Demand Curve,” Economic Inquiry, 1978, reprinted in The
Economist as Preacher.
14 Paolo Sylos-Labini, Oligopoly and Technical Progress (Harvard University Press, 1962); Joe S. Bain,
“A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly,” American Economic Review, 1949; Franco Modiglia-
ni, “New Developments on the Oligopoly Front,” Journal of Political Economy, June 1958.
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explanatory powers of the Coasian and Pigovian approaches has been under-
taken.
Why did not the profession seek directly to test these theories, and, for that
matter, the four theories of the 1930’s that I characterized as largely unsuccess-
ful innovations? Some part of the answer may lie in the fact that formal
empirical tests of economic theories have historically been scarce, although
they are increasing in frequency, but I would not press this answer. Instead,
the testing procedure - the trial by combat - takes a different form.
It is seldom that a theory in economics has a well-defined domain of
applicability. It may have been created to explain a specific class of events - the
pricing by oligopolists when entry is possible, in the first illustration above -
but it always has a wider domain of possible applicability. The specification of
a critical test which, if conducted correctly on a sufficient scale, will decide the
combat between two alternative theories, is seldom possible over the whole
range of the domains of the two theories.
Economists have therefore generally chosen to decide between the alterna-
tive theories by the process of using each to explore a variety of problems. How
does the limit theory of oligopoly pricing, for example, handle the process of
growth of an industry or the phenomenon of vertical integration? How does the
Coasian theory illuminate the structure of the law of torts or the economics of
professional sports? These explorations are a form of testing of the theories:
they test the fertility of the theories (or at least the intellectual fertility of
economists), and the varied applications are partial empirical tests of the
theories. Gradually a consensus emerges among the economists working on the
subject: the theory becomes a part of the standard analytical corpus or it dies of
neglect.
5. CONCLUSION
Our list of factors which influence the receptivity of a science to new ideas could
easily be extended.
In particular, it would be useful to examine the question of whether the
attractiveness of the public policy positions associated with a theory has an
effect upon the acceptability of the theory. The textbooks on methodology
lecture us on the need to separate positive and normative theories. The study of
economics tells us that few if any theories lead unequivocally to one set of policy
implications. So science and policy should be separated. Are they? I believe
that the separation has been far from complete, especially in the short run, but
this is not the occasion to undertake the substantial study necessary to support
the belief.
Again, the institutional organization of economic research is a potential
influence upon the receptiveness of a science to new ideas. The powerful
institutional position of Schmoller and the German Historical School no doubt
played a role in the slow development of economic science in Germany after
1870. The dominant role of Cambridge University in economics from Marshall
to Keynes surely was not favorable to the receptiveness of new ideas from70 Economic Sciences 1982
outsiders. I believe that the shift of the center of economics to the United States
was due in some part to the failure of the English economists to share fully in
the quantitative empirical study of economics.
Even if I extended this list of potential determinants of scientific choice, and
documented each more fully than I have, I would still have kept my promise
not to tell you the detailed characteristics of the successful new theories in
economic science. I do not lament this failure.
The fascination of scientific work does not lie in the craftsmanlike utilization
of the tools of a science. It is admirable for the gymnast to put his splendidly
disciplined body through intricate maneuvers, and it is no doubt equally
admirable for the scientist to put his disciplined mind through a sequence of
complex analytical or experimental maneuvers. The great fascination of scien-
tific endeavor, however, is precisely in the speculative pursuit of new ideas that
will widen the horizon of our understanding of the world. This endeavor is not
that of a graceful intellectual gymnast: on the contrary, the scientist is
stumbling about in a jungle of ideas or facts that seem to defy system or logic,
and usually he fails to emerge with anything but scratches. The dangers of the
search include the chance that a gifted rival will reach the goal, and the danger
is not reduced by the fact that the rivalry is conducted under what for able and
ambitious competitors are unusually chivalrous rules. Still, learning more
about how this search for new knowledge proceeds is itself a worthy search for
new knowledge, and we shall not abandon it.
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